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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
EUGENE ABE,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 940149-CA
Priority No. 15

GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to UCA 78-2-2(3).

The Supreme Court has transferred this case to

the Court of Appeals pursuant to UCA 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to find that Plaintiff had

made out an implied-in-fact contract?

The standard for review of

this issue is that, once the evidence is marshaled in a manner most
favorable to the trial court's decision, including all inferences
that can be reasonably drawn from it, an appellate court will
uphold the judgment if the findings are not clearly erroneous.
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P..2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Were

the

trial

court's

findings

of

fact

as

to

the

existence of an implied-in-fact contract against the clear weight
of the evidence?

The standard for review of this issue is that an

appellate

court will not

set aside the trial court's

factual

findings unless they are clearly erroneous, "if the findings...are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made." Brixen & Christopher, Arch. v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039,
1042 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
[Utah 1987]).
3.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's

finding as to damages?

The standard for review of this issue is

that an appellate court will not set aside the findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. Brixon & Christopher, Arch, v. Elton,
at 1042; Christensen v. Munns, supra,

supra,

at 73.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
There are no determinative

authorities

in regards to the

issues of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a trial involving an action for damages
due to a breach of an implied in fact contract.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Bruce K.
Halliday presiding, on June 11, 1993.

On July 13, 1993, the Court

entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a judgment
(attached hereto as Addendum Number 1 ) .
C.

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT

The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
2

against the Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Abe is a resident of Arizona and was employed by the
Defendant to be the general manager of a truck stop, motel, and
restaurant. Trial, Tr. 3-4.1

Mr. Abe had an oral understanding

with his employer as to the terms of his services and compensation.
Tr. 5.

He left his employment in 1991 in order to seek employment

elsewhere. Tr.5.

The basic terms of his employment were that in

return for his management services he was to be paid a salary,
receive a share of profits, and to take a period of time off for
vacation.

Tr.5.

The Court found, in reviewing the evidence and

credibility of the witnesses, that an implied-in-fact contracted
existed

between

the

parties. Tr.

140-141; Findings

of

Fact,

Paragraph 4, Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 1.
The Defendant claimed that Mr. Abe was only entitled to a
bonus if he were working on the April following the end of the year
the bonus was to be calculated.

However, the Court ruled, after

considering the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, that
this contention was not part of the parties' understanding and that
the bonus should be calculated on a prorated basis. Tr. 141;
Findings of Fact, Paragraph 6.
There

remained

the

question

of

the

calculate the bonus due Mr. Abe for 1991.

manner

in

which

to

Mr. Abe was to receive

bonuses in the form of payments to him based on a percentage of the

1

The trial transcript is found at R. 45-191. References to
the trial record are to the pages in the original transcript.
3

business net profit. Tr.6. He received such bonuses for the years
1989 and 1990. Tr.6.

Mr. Abe claimed that he was entitled to a

partial bonus for the one-half of 1991 that he worked.

The total

of his percentage of the net profit of the three truck stop
businesses for the time period he was employed in 1991 (one-half
year) was $6,522.39. Tr.7-8. The Court determined that Mr. Abe was
due one-half of the bonus for 1991. Tr.141; Memorandum Decision,
Page 1 (attached hereto as Addendum Number 2). The Court ruled
that the bonus would have to be calculated on a prorated basis for
the time

he was

employed. Tr.

141.

The Court

accordingly

calculated the one-half year amount due Mr. Abe on the basis of the
sums paid to Plaintiff's successor for 1991, $11,000.00, and by
considering other compensation, Tr. 92, arrived at an award of
$5,500.00. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 9, Conclusions of Law,
Paragraph 3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence was sufficient in regards to the trial court's
finding that an implied-in-fact

contract existed between the

parties. Appellant failed to marshal the evidence in a manner most
favorable to the trial court's decision.

This Court should

therefore assume that the record supports the findings of the trial
court.
The trial court findings were not against the clear weight of
the evidence.

Appellant failed to marshal the evidence.

This

Court should therefore assume that the record supports the findings
of the trial court.
4

The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's
determination of damages. Appellant failed to marshal the evidence
and demonstrate why the trial court's damage calculations were
clearly erroneous.

This Court should therefore assume that the

record supports the findings of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT.
The Supreme Court has only recently recognized implied-in-fact
contracts. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044-1045
(Utah 1989).

The Courts can hold that a contractual relationship

arises from a variety of practices, including the conduct of the
parties,
supra,
917

personnel

policies, and

other

circumstances. Berube,

at 1044 (citing Puqh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.Rptr.
[Cal. App.

1981]).

The

existence

of

an

implied-in-fact

agreement is a question of fact "which turns on the objective
manifestations of the parties' intent." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991).

The Johnson Court, at 1002,

also held that a unilateral contract analysis governs the question
of implied-in-fact contracts.2 The understanding between Mr. Abe
and Green River Development Associates complies with the Johnson
2

Johnson, at 1002, stated that "[u]nder a unilateral contract
analysis, an employer's promise of employment under certain terms
and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms of the
employment contract and the employer's consideration for the
employment contract.
The employee's performance of service
pursuant to the employer's offer constitutes both the employee's
acceptance of the offer and the employee's consideration for the
contract."
5

standards.
Green

River

Development

Associates,

through

one

of

its

officers, offered Mr. Abe employment as the manager of their truck
stop, motel, and restaurant operation at Green River, Utah. Tr. 4,
75-66. See, Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., supra,

at 1001-1002.

The terms of the employment were that Mr. Abe would (1) manage the
business operation and in return receive $40,000.00 a year, (2)
receive a share of profits (10% for the restaurant and motel, and
5% of the truck stop), and (3) receive four weeks vacation. Tr. 5;
Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5. Johnson, supra,

at 1002.

The terms

of the contract were definite. Tr. 5; Findings of Fact, Paragraph
5;

Johnson,

supra,

at

1002.

The

terms

of

the

parties'

understanding were established by virtue of the oral statements and
conversations

that

Mr.

Abe

had

with

the

company's

corporate

officer, Mr William Greaves. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4.

The

Court established some of the terms of employment from facts which
were in dispute by the parties, and resolved each such conflict by
reviewing the testimony and determining the credibility of the
witnesses. Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 6-8.

Mr. Abe performed

services pursuant to this understanding. Tr. 5. See, Johnson,
supra,

at 1002.

Green River Development paid to Mr. Abe wages and

bonuses for services rendered pursuant to the agreement. Tr. 5-6.
The evidence accepted by the Court clearly established an impliedin-fact contract.
The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that evidence of
conduct

and

oral

statements

may
6

establish

an

implied-in-fact

contract even where no written policies or documents exist. Hodgson
v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992).

The Court, at

334, also stated that the evidence supporting such an agreement
must be "strong enough to overcome the presumption of at-will
employment and any inconsistent written policies and disclaimers."
There were no written documents, consistent or inconsistent, which
were crucial to a determination of the parties understanding. Tr.4,
101-102; Findings of Fact, Paragraph 3.

The evidence accepted by

the Court as to the existence and terms of a contract was certainly
strong enough to overcome any presumption to the contrary.
Appellant is obliged to marshal the evidence in a manner most
favorable to the trial court's decision before making an argument
supra.

that the evidence is insufficient. Christensen v. Munns.

However, Green River Development Associates merely recites portions
of the record supporting factual arguments that were rejected by
the trial court. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, Pages 9-10 (method
and manner of calculating bonus payment).

Moreover, Green River

Development Associates makes no argument that elements of the
contract other than in regards to the bonus calculation were not
established by sufficient evidence.
there

was

adequate

evidence

implied-in-fact contract.

Mr. Abe has demonstrated that

supporting

the

existence

River

Development

an

The evidence also was sufficient to

establish the terms of the parties' understanding.
Green

of

Associates

that

the

The argument of
evidence

insufficient to support the judgment is simply incorrect.
POINT TWO
7

is

THE FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH
AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT.
The Court found Mr. Abe was engaged to manage and operate a
restaurant and truck at stop at Green River, Utah. Findings of
Fact,

Paragraph

2, Page

2.

There

was

no written

summarizing the terms of this business relationship.
Fact, Paragraph 2, Page 2.

agreement

Findings of

Mr. Abe and a company representative

had conversations, and statements were made, which established the
contractual relationship. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4, Page 2.
The Court also held that the parties' acts in performance of the
agreement

also

established

the

terms

of

the

contractual

relationship. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4, Page 2.
The trial court determined that all terms of the contractual
relationship were clearly established.

The Court found that Mr.

Abe was to be paid a salary. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5, Page 2.
He was also to receive a bonus, based on a percentage of the
business profits. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5, Page 2.

The

Court, after reviewing the testimony and assessing the credibility
of the witnesses, expressly rejected the contention that Mr. Abe
must have been employed on the date of the disbursement of the
bonus in order to be entitled to that payment. Findings of Fact,
Paragraph 6, Page 7.
Green River Development Associates is obligated to marshal all
relevant

evidence

that

tends

to

support

the

demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous.

findings

and

West Valley

City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991).
Appellant has failed to properly set out the facts. No meaningful
8

argument is made as to why the evidence fails to support the
findings. An appellate court must therefore assume that the record
supports the findings of the trial court. Wade v. Stanql, 232 Utah
Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah App. 1994).

This Court should uphold the

trial court's findings in every respect.
Green

River

Development

Associates

argues

that

there

is

evidence which shows that Mr. Abe was not eligible for the bonus
because

he was

disbursed.
believed

not working

at the time the bonus was to be

However, the trial court rejected this contention and

Mr. Abe's narrative

of the facts. Findings

of Fact,

Paragraphs 6-7, Page 2. The trial court is in the best position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P
(due

regard

given

to

opportunity

of

trial

court

to

judge

credibility of witnesses); Adoption of McKinstray v. McKinstrav,
628

P.2d

1286,

consideration

of

1289

(Utah

1981)

believability

of

(court's

findings

reflect

witnesses' testimony).

An

appellate court should not second guess this function. State v.
Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah App. 1987); Henderson v. For-Shor
Co. , 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988) (clearly erroneous standard does
not eliminate the deference traditionally accorded the fact finder
to determine the credibility of the witnesses).

Appellate courts

usually defer to a trial court's factual assessment unless there is
clear error. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P; Copper State Leasing Co. v.
Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988). 3
3

Appellant

In State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984), the
Supreme Court said: "It is not our function to determine the
credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences to
9

has demonstrated no such shortcoming.

The findings are therefore

adequate and should not be disturbed on appeal.
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT AS TO DAMAGES.
The

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

damages

which

are

so

speculative as to be without a rational basis in the evidence
should not be upheld. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah
1983).

However, the Bastian court also stated:

"...it is generally recognized that some degree of uncertainty
in the evidence of damages will not suffice to relieve a
defendant from recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as
there is some rational basis for a damage award, it is the
wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty
Winshness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P.2d 1 3 0 3
(1979). Where there is evidence of the fact of damage, a
defendant may not escape liability because the amount of
damage cannot be proved with precision."
The Court of Appeals has taken the same position. Price-Orem v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 478 n. 1 & 479 (Utah App.
1989

(citing Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 [Utah App.

1989]) .4
The Supreme Court has held that "The level of persuasiveness

be drawn therefrom."
4

The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the rule against
recovery of uncertain damages is usually directed against
uncertainty with respect to cause rather than to measure or extent,
so that a party who has broken his contract will not ordinarily be
permitted to escape liability because of uncertainty in amount of
damage resulting, and the fact that the full extent of damages for
breach of contract must be a matter of speculation is not ground
for refusing all damages." Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah
1981) (citing Winshness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah,
supra,
and Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d
802, 805 [Utah 1957]).
10

required to establish the fact of loss is generally higher than
that required to establish the amount of a loss." Atkin Wright &
Miles v. Mountain States Tel. , 709 P.2d

330, 336

(Utah

1985)

(citing Cook Associates v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 [Utah
1983] and Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
supra).

In Atkin, supra,

at 336, the Supreme Court stated that

the rationale for this approach is that "[i]t is after all, the
wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should bear the
burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages...there still
must be evidence that rises above
reasonable,

even

though

not

speculation

necessarily

and provides a

precise,

estimate

of

damages" (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has stated: "Damages are properly measured
by amounts necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed" Alexander v. Brown,
646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) (citing Keller v. Deseret Mortuary
Co., 455 P.2d 197 [Utah 1969]). See, also, Craig Food Industries,
Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 284 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Robert
v. Anderson, 681 P.2d 1326, 1333 [Wyo. 1984]).
Plaintiff

need

only

demonstrate

the

amount

In that regard,
of

damages

with

"sufficient certainty" to permit the fact finder to make an award,
although the damages need not be proven with precision. Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d

667, 671 (Utah

1982) (citing 5A Corbin, Contracts, Section 1022 [1964]).
This Court has held that [w]here evidence is controverted, we
assume that the trial judge believed those aspects of the evidence
11

and the inferences reasonably drawn from them that support his
decision." Brixen & Christopher, Arch, v. Elton, supra,

at 1042

(citing Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d
1296, 1302 [Utah 1987]).

The Court concluded that the bonus amount

due Mr. Abe would under no circumstances be less than one-half of
the

total

bonus

paid

to

his

successor.

Since

that

sum

was

$11,000.00, Mr. Abe was awarded half, or $5,500.00. Memorandum
Decision, Pages 1-2; Findings of Fact, Paragraph 9; Conclusions of
Law, Paragraph 3.

The record in this case fully supports the

judge's conclusions.
Mr.

Greaves,

Associates,

the

testified

president
that

the

of

Green

manager

Memorandum Decision, Page 2; Tr. 89-92.

River

Development

received

$11,000.00.

The Court also based the

decision as to the amount of damages, in part, on the sums that Mr.
Abe received the one full year that he was working and received a
bonus. Tr. 143. Considerable testimony was received concerning the
bonus for past years. E.g., Tr. 89-92.

The Court considered this

data and made a decision as to the amount due Mr. Abe.
amount,

while

not

a

precise

calculation,

falls

This

within

the

acceptable limits that trial courts are allowed when determining
damages.

Green

River

Development

Associates

demonstrated

failing in the evidence which was clearly erroneous.5
5

no

The trial

Green River Development Associates failed to marshal the
evidence as to damages in a manner most favorable to the trial
court's decision. Christensen v. Munns, supra.
Appellant also
failed to demonstrate why the damage calculations were clearly
erroneous. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., supra.
This Court
should therefore assume that the record supports the findings of
the trial court. Wade v. Stanql, supraf
at 21.
12

court's findings are therefore not clearly erroneous and should be
sustained by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the judgment, and award Mr. Abe his
costs on appeal.
Dated this 17th day of March, 1994.

Eric P. Swenson
Attorney for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Eric P. Swenson, attorney for Appellee, hereby certifies that
he did mail two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to
George S. Diumenti II, Diumenti, Lewis & Hart, 505 South Main
Street, Bountiful, Utah, 84010, this 17th day of March, 1994.
Dated this 17th day of March, 1994.

Eric P. Swenson
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM NUMBER ONE

SB'FMTH DISTRICT m i 'RT
t Vu><", ('., n o t ' '
FHfr

Eric P. Swenson, # 3171
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-2843

JUl 1 3 M i
C L L M K ;>I H i t ' t

BY
Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE ABE,
PLAINTIFF,
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES, INC., A Utah
Corporation,

CIVIL NO. 9207-48

DEFENDANT,

This matter came on for trial on the 11th day of June, 1993,
the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, presiding.
Plaintiff was present and represented by his attorney, Eric P.
Swenson.
Defendant

was

present

through

a

corporate

officer

and

represented by its attorney, George S. Diumenti II.
The Court having heard the evidence and the arguments of the
parties, having entered a Memorandum Decision, and now therefore
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Tuba City, Arizona, and

Ohm

formerly a manager of the Defendants' restaurant and truck stop
business in Green River, Utah.
2. The Defendant Green River Development Associates, Inc., is
a Utah corporation, and conducts a restaurant and truck stop
business located in Green River, Grand County, Utah.
3.

Plaintiff was engaged to manage and operate Defendant's

business in Green River, Utah.
A

There was no written agreement.

Defendant hired Plaintiff pursuant to an implied in fact

employment

contract.

This

contract,

and

its

terms,

were

established by virtue of the oral statements and conversations that
Plaintiff had with Defendant's corporate officer, William Greaves,
and by virtue of the ongoing acts of the parties as they performed
pursuant to said agreement.
5. The terms of the employment contract were that
was to be paid
payments.

Plaintiff

$40,000.00 per year in twelve equal monthly

The parties' obligations under the employment contract

were to be performed on an ongoing and annual basis. In addition,
Plaintiff received a 10% bonus of the profits of the restaurant and
motel operation and a 5% bonus of the profit of the truck stop.
The profits of the various businesses were determined by the use of
"reconstructed profit and loss statements" and compilation reports,
and the statements pertaining to the periods in question were
admitted without objection and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
The bonus payments were made by Defendant to the Plaintiff for the
years 1989 and 1990.
6.

Defendant contends that bonus payments were, as a term of
2

the agreement, contingent on Plaintiff's having been employed on
the date of the disbursement of the bonus, or April of each year.
However, the Court, in reviewing the testimony and credibility of
the witnesses, determines that no such understanding of the parties
had i1, I .•• '" occurred.
7.

The Court has examined Exhibit ] , and considered the

testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, and determines that no
additional bonus payments were due Plaintiff for the year 1990.
8.

The Court, in considering the testimony and demeanor of

the witnesses, determines that the Plaintiff is not entitled to
compensation for vacation time for 1991 in part due to Plaintiff's
absences from the business.
9.

Plaintiff

is entitled to a bonus payment

from the

Defendant for the year 1991. The amount of this bonus payment is
no less than one-half of the total bonus paid to Plaintiff's
successor ($11,000.00), or $5,500.00.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to his costs and should submit a

cost bill and include the same in the proposed judgment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that an implied in fact employment

contract existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
2.

The Court concludes that the statute of frauds does not

apply to this the employment contract because the contractual
obligations were to be performed on an ongoing and annual basis.
3. Plaintiff is therefore to be awarded the sum of $5,500

I

which is the bonus payment due for 1991. Plaintiff is not entitled
3

to a bonus payment for 1990. Plaintiff is further not entitled to
a cash payment for the vacation time.
4.

Plaintiff is entitled/to his-costs of bring this action.

Dated this &

day of^fflY^l.993.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

4

ADDENDUM NUMBER TWO

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
m

JUN 2 2 1993
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY__
Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EUGENE ABB,
Plaintiff,
:
:

vs
GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES, INC., A Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

:
:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Civil NO. 9207-48
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

This matter, upon stipulation of counsel for change of
venue, was tried to the Court, Bruce K. Halliday, District Judge
presiding on the 11th day of June, 1993 in Price, Carbon County,
State of Utah,

Plaintiff was present represented by Eric Swenson

his attorney; defendant was represented by its attorney Mr.
George Diumenti and was present by and through its president, Mr.
William S. Grieves.

In hearing the testimony of the parties and

arguments of the attorneys, the Court concluded on the day of
trial that an employment contract existed; proof of same was not
barred by the statute of frauds and took under advisement the
amount of damages to be awarded based upon the bonuses earned.
The Court has attempted to extrapolate from the evidence presented and has concluded that under no circumstances would the
amount due and owing Mr. Abe for bonuses earned during the period
of his employment be less than one-half of the total bonus which
was paid to Mr. Allen Burns, Mr. Abe's successor.

That amount

Ruling
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was testified to be the sum of $11,000, one-half thereof being
the sum of $5,500 and which the Court finds is the reasonable
damages to be awarded to the defendant contrary to the damages
which the defendant testified were $6,522,39 but based on only
six months operating data.
The Court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover any additional bonus and/or amounts for the period 1990,
nor is he entitled to recover any amounts for compensation for
vacation time not taken by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is entitled to costs, but a cost bill
should be provided by counsel.
The Court directs the plaintiff to prepare findings,
conclusions and judgment accordingly.
DATED this ^^^L—--day of June, 1993.

Bruce K. Halliday, Dis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the o^v

day of June, 1993, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
DECISION, postage prepaid to the following:
Eric P. Swenson
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, UT 84535

George S. Diumenti II
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
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